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FOREWORD
The proliferation in recent decades of international courts and tribunals with
various jurisdictions and structures, as well as of judicial institutions with
international participation, inevitably begs the following questions: What is the
nature of their authority? And what should be their role in the shaping of a
coherent international legal order? As some of these courts and tribunals have
recently reached the end of their mandates or are about to close their doors, it is
time for an assessment of their performance. In this context, the Copenhagen
session of the Brandeis Institute for International Judges (BIIJ), held in July
2016, proved a timely and challenging event. Judges from different courts and
tribunals, along with academics from the Danish research project on
international courts (iCourts) of the local university, gathered to discuss the
authority of the international judiciary in a very stimulating and beneficial
partnership.
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The debate, initially introduced by an article of the iCourts director, was
passionate, rigorous, and comprehensive while at the same time varied, as
suggested by the term “authority.” In referring in general to the “authority” of
international courts and tribunals, the theme of the Institute was clearly not a
univocal one. As reflected in any dictionary, the word “authority” has different
meanings, and each of them may capture features of the status and activity of a
judicial body—from merely formal and factual legal implications to the
reliability and moral performance of an institution that must be authoritative so
as to inspire trust and respect in society. The purpose was to capture all or as
many as possible of these relevant features, and this report of the Institute
abundantly shows how this goal was achieved.
Where does the authority of international courts and tribunals lie? The
capacity to carry out their mandate under their respective statutes, and the
degree of compliance with their decisions, are certainly useful indicators, but
they do not exhaust the question. The impact of their judicial activity on States
and the communities of individuals within their jurisdictions, as well as the
acceptance of their decisions, are even more significant indicators. Ultimately,
the quality of their jurisprudence, and the degree of their public reliability as an
independent expression of justice, appear to be decisive factors in assessing the
authority of international courts. In this perspective, are international courts and
tribunals under an obligation to discharge their function by contributing to the
formation of a coherent international legal order? Fragmentation and differences
of views are unavoidable, but inter-judicial dialogue can remove inconsistencies
and contribute authoritatively to the evolution of international customary law as
a common legal denominator in international relations, thus removing
incoherence on basic legal principles.
The debate remains open on most of the issues raised during the Institute,
but the discussions were intense and rewarding. These discussions also
frequently built upon conversations from previous sessions regarding ethical
aspects of the international judicial function.
I have personally had the opportunity to participate in each BIIJ since the
program’s inception in 2002—as a participant, session leader, and member of
the Program Committee—and thus have been witness to its progressive
development. After 15 years, the initiative taken by the International Center for
Ethics, Justice and Public Life of Brandeis University should be regarded as an
invaluable and irreplaceable forum for addressing fundamental ethical as well as
practical questions which, are central to the action and performance of the
international judiciary.
Fausto Pocar
Appeals Judge and former President,
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
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ABOUT THE INSTITUTE
Judges serving on the benches of 12 international courts and tribunals met in
Copenhagen from June 27 to 30, 2016 for the eleventh session of the Brandeis
Institute for International Judges (BIIJ). This small and confidential event, unique
in the world of international justice, was carried out as an institutional
partnership between the International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life of
Brandeis University, and iCourts, the Danish National Research Foundation’s
Centre of Excellence for International Courts at the University of Copenhagen,
Faculty of Law.
The Institute’s theme, “The Authority of International Courts and Tribunals:
Challenges and Prospects,” was inspired in part from research iCourts scholars
are currently conducting. The aim of the institute was to explore the nature of the
authority of international courts and tribunals, the various challenges this
authority may face in different types of jurisdictions, and the ways in which
judicial institutions might enhance their authority in the eyes of constituents,
parties, and the broader public.
Session topics included: the authority of international courts; definitions
and dilemmas; challenges and strategies related to the authority of judicial
institutions; the role of international judges in building a coherent international
legal order; the internal aspects of the functioning of international courts; and
evaluating the performance of international courts. Participants were also
introduced to the iCourts research agenda by Director Mikael Rask Madsen and
heard from two scholars about their findings. This was followed by a
stimulating discussion between scholars and judges about how research on
international courts and tribunals can be relevant to judicial practice.
Brandeis Ethics Center Director Daniel Terris and Director of Programs in
International Justice and Society Leigh Swigart also had the opportunity to
present the Center’s Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project and receive feedback
about its future form.
The Institute ended with a public roundtable on “The Role of International
Courts in Combatting Terrorism and Ensuring Peace.” Judge David
Baragwanath of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, University of Copenhagen
Professor Jens Elo Rytter, and former United Nations Under-Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs Hans Corell each offered insightful remarks on this topic,
which current events have rendered increasingly critical to global well-being.
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BIIJ 2016 Participants
International Judges
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights
•Solomy Bossa (Uganda)
• Fatsah Ouguergouz (Algeria/France), Program Committee member
Caribbean Court of Justice
• President Sir Dennis Byron (St. Kitts & Nevis), Program Committee member
East African Court of Justice
• Emmanuel Ugirashebuja (Rwanda)
European Court of Human Rights
• Vice-President András Sajó (Hungary)
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia
• Oliver Beauvallet (France)
International Criminal Court
• President Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi (Argentina)
• Christine Van den Wyngaert (Belgium), Program Committee member
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
• President Vagn Joensen (Denmark), Program Committee member
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
• Fausto Pocar (Italy)
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
• Tómas Heidar (Iceland)
Residual Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals
• President Theodor Meron (USA)
Special Tribunal for Lebanon
• David Baragwanath (New Zealand)
World Trade Organization Appellate Body
• Ujal Bhatia (India)
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BIIJ Co-Directors
• David Thór Björgvinsson—Professor, University of Copenhagen, Faculty of
Law; former Judge of the European Court of Human Rights in respect of Iceland
• Richard Goldstone—former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; retired Justice of the South
African Constitutional Court
Conveners
• Henrik Stampe Lund—Administrator, iCourts
• Mikael Rask Madsen—Professor and Director, iCourts
• Leigh Swigart—Director of Programs in International Justice and Society,
International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life, Brandeis University
• Daniel Terris—Director, International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public
Life, Brandeis University
Rapporteurs
• Kerstin Bree Carlson—Researcher, iCourts
• Harry James Rose—LL.M. student, University of Copenhagen
Interns
• Chantal Sochaczevski—Brandeis University, class of 2017
• Lee Wilson—Brandeis University, class of 2018 Invited Guests and Presenters
• Hans Corell—former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs
• Federico Fabbrini—Associate Professor and Researcher, iCourts
• Andreas Føllesdal—Co-director, PluriCourts, University of Oslo
• Urška Šadl—Associate Professor and Researcher, iCourts
• Geir Ulfstein—Co-director, PluriCourts, University of Oslo
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PLENARY DISCUSSIONS
1. The Authority of International Courts and Tribunals: Definitions and
Dilemmas
The opening session of BIIJ 2016, led by iCourts Director Mikael Rask
Madsen, was designed to flesh out the concept of “authority” in relation to
international courts and tribunals. This concept was articulated in a recent article
by Madsen, Karen J. Alter, and Laurence R. Helfer entitled “How Context
Shapes the Authority of International Courts.”1 The article provides the
framework and general theory for a larger project of comparatively assessing the
authority of a large sample of currently active international courts (ICs) in the
world.2
The main objective of the article is to explain wide variation in the activity
and influence of the nearly two dozen ICs currently in existence. What factors
lead some ICs to become active and prominent judicial bodies that cast a rule-oflaw shadow beyond the courtroom, while others remain moribund or legally and
politically sidelined? The article provides both a novel conceptualization of
authority tailored to ICs and an in-depth discussion of the many contextual
factors that impact ICs’ authority.
The article introduces a key distinction between de jure and de facto
authority.3 The implication is that formally delegated authority is insufficient for
an IC to be effective. The authors argue instead that for an IC to gain de facto
authority, it requires: (1) recognition that there is an obligation to comply with an
institution’s rulings; and (2) engagement in meaningful action that pushes toward
giving full effect to those rulings.
The authors also describe three levels of IC authority: 4 (i) “narrow
authority,” which exists when only the parties to a particular dispute take
meaningful steps toward compliance with a court’s ruling; (ii) “intermediate
authority,” which is achieved when the ruling is respected also by potential future
litigants as well as “compliance partners”—executive branch officials,
administrative agency officials, and judges; and (iii) “extensive authority,” which
exists when an international court’s audience expands beyond its compliance
partners to encompass a broader range of actors, including civil society groups,
bar associations, industries, and legal academics.5 ICs with extensive authority
1. Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the Authority of
International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–36 (2016).
2. The other empirical studies are available as open source at: DUKE LAW: LAW & CONTEMPORARY
PROBLEMS, https://lcp.law.duke.edu/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).
3. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 1, at 1–36.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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consistently shape law and politics for one or more legal issues within their
jurisdictions.
Interestingly, these levels of authority do not necessarily increase
incrementally from narrow to extensive. In fact, an IC may well achieve
extensive authority—that is, recognition and influence in wider legal circles and
with the general public—without having achieved compliance by parties directly
affected by its decisions or by government actors.
Furthermore, the article makes a slightly controversial distinction between
“legitimacy” and “authority.”6 The argument for sidelining questions of
legitimacy is that it appears from empirical studies ICs can do everything
normative theorists might expect of a legitimate international judicial body
without authority in fact. In other words, why audiences recognize ICs and take
consequential steps regarding their decisions is not assessed as a key factor for
explaining ICs’ authority.
Madsen asked BIIJ participants to think about how this model of authority
fits their own institutions and the contexts in which they operate. What are the
external factors shaping the authority of their institutions at the political, legal,
and societal levels? What means are available to international judges inside and
outside the courtroom to influence audiences and contexts? How can ICs build
trust in key audiences, including domestic courts? What kinds of implementation
and compliance challenges do judges’ institutions face?
Judges had several reactions and queries regarding this model of authority.
One institution not mentioned in the Madsen et al. article was the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).7 A participant explained that its
authority might look weak given that it had just celebrated its 20th anniversary
but only adjudicated 20 cases to date.8 But the reality is that States have
alternatives to bringing a case concerning law of the sea matters before ITLOS,
namely using the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or a special arbitration panel
instead.9 It was suggested that the authority model should consider whether an
institution has mandatory jurisdiction or not. It was also pointed out that the
limited cases decided by ITLOS have seen an excellent compliance rate, and its
jurisprudence has clarified much about the prompt release of vessels and the
setting of bond. The participant concluded, “[t]he Tribunal is quite authoritative,
so much so that states don’t need to bring [these kinds of] cases.”
The Madsen et al. article did assess the authority of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, indicating that it has authority at all
6. Id.
7. The Tribunal, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR L. SEA, https://www.itlos.org/the-tribunal/ (last visited Dec. 6,
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Cases, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR L. SEA, https://www.itlos.org/cases/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
9. The Tribunal, supra note 7.
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levels.10 A participant noted that when the Appellate Body rules, it always keeps
its constituencies in mind as the rulings are binding on them. It is also important
to think about the interests of business, the interface between trade and the
environment, as well as views on the benefits of globalization and
interdependence. There are many “questioning voices” about these issues and
sometimes a breakdown in consensus. He conceded that “like it or not, outside
opinions inform Appellate Body decisions.”
A human rights judge suggested that to really understand the authority and
impact of an IC, one must look at the relation of its rulings to state parties. If a
judgment results in a definition of the continental shelf, for example, “no one is a
loser in the long run.” And if the International Criminal Court (ICC) rules against
Kenyan defendants, it is bad for the Kenyan government “but it doesn’t change
the game for the community.” On the other hand, if a court like the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) takes a position on police powers, “it changes
the game for all states and they may all feel like they are losers.”
Another human rights judge questioned the distinction between de jure and
de facto authority. “For me, legal authority, de jure authority, is linked to the
authority of the judgment itself, a judgment of good quality. And de facto
authority is its overall impact on society.” He furthermore suggested that it is
important to see how a court contributes to “fertilizing the soil” in its jurisdiction
so it can strengthen the rule of law.
Judges from international criminal tribunals had the most questions about
how the authority of their institutions might be assessed. Several asked about the
role of their institutions’ formal sources of authority—the United Nations
Charter’s Chapter VII11 for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), and to some extent the Special Tribunal
for Lebanon (STL), and the Rome Treaty for the ICC, with special situation
referral by the Security Council also based on Chapter VII. One judge noted, in
relation to Serbia and the ICTY, that “just because something comes from
Chapter VII doesn’t mean there is compliance.” Another judge remarked the
STL’s authority appears “to turn on things beyond the Charter itself.” Basing the
ICC on a multi-party treaty instead of a Security Council resolution, pointed out a
participant, “was considered at the time a better democratic foundation for a
court.” But the ICC’s foundation has also led to problems of de jure authority.
“An institution which is global should be globally supported,” the judge
continued, alluding to the fact that several states, including some very powerful

10. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 1.
11. This chapter of the Charter addresses “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression.” Chapter VII, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sections/uncharter/chapter-vii/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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ones, have not ratified the Rome Treaty.12 “If an institution is perceived as weak,
it cannot address the matters that people think are important.”
The discussion then turned to the relationship among a criminal tribunal’s
mandate, its actual accomplishments, and its perceived authority. ICTY
objectives included not only prosecutions and trials, but also reconciliation and
establishment of a narrative about the Balkans conflict.13 That region’s
population may evaluate the ICTY’s authority not just on its jurisprudence, but
also its success in the latter, non-legal areas. How authoritative can the ICTY be,
asked a judge, when “each of the regions still has its own narrative where they
see themselves as victims and don’t accept others as victims?”
Another judge brought up the ICTR, noting that its “factual authority” is
weaker than that of the ICTY, given the ICTR closed its doors with some
indictees still at large.14 On the other hand, he continued, “the gold standard of
the ICTR is Rwanda, a haven of stability, whereas wars continued in Bosnia and
broke out in Kosovo after the creation of the ICTY.” Nonetheless, the authority
model discussed in the session would assign more complete authority to the
ICTY. A judge from another criminal court raised a fundamental issue: “When
we discuss performance indicators [of ICs], it is important to ask about how to
measure impact. And impact on what? And on whom?”
Madsen replied that the framework on IC authority is not about performance
in a narrow sense, that is, about whether courts are accomplishing what is
outlined in their mandates. He also explained that their concept of authority does
not depend on a formal source but rather, in a Weberian approach, on the impacts
a court has on various levels of society. The model is a sociological construct that
goes beyond performance-based assessment. Madsen conceded, however, that
the model seems to have better explanatory power for courts dealing with
regional and economic matters and human rights than for international criminal
tribunals.
BIIJ participants appreciated their discussion of this new model of authority
in the international judicial sphere, as well as the new perspectives it offered on
their own and colleagues’ institutions. Following this discussion of a more
abstract theory of the authority of international courts, the next session gave the
participants the opportunity to explore how challenges to authority play out in the
daily operation of ICs.

12.. The State Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/
pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
13. About the ICTY, U.N. INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
http://www.icty.org/en/about (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
14. Alastair Leithead, Rwanda Genocide: International Criminal Tribunal Closes, BBC (Dec. 14, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35070220 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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2. The Authority of International Courts and Tribunals: Challenges
and Strategies
The second session of BIIJ 2016 aimed to further the discussions around IC
authority initiated in the first session. Session leaders Vagn Joensen, President of
the ICTR during its final three years of operation, and Richard Goldstone, former
ICTY Prosecutor and BIIJ Co-Director, delved into the authority challenges
faced by international criminal courts and tribunals in particular, to set the stage
for the sharing of experiences across other types of jurisdictions. The ultimate
objective of this session was for the assembled judges to think about possible
strategies for both overcoming challenges to authority and for enhancing
authority.
Joensen, who continues to serve as judge of the Residual Mechanism for
International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) since the ICTR closed, presented some
of the issues faced by international criminal institutions in relation to: (i) their de
jure authority, in particular the challenge of persuading states to become state
parties to the permanent criminal court(s) and the challenge of persuading state
parties to these courts—as well as partner states to the hybrid courts—not to
reverse their membership; (ii) their de facto authority, in particular when states
do not comply with their obligations to cooperate on investigations, the arrest and
transfer of suspects and/or by interfering with witnesses (whether the noncompliance/interference aims at preventing influential suspects from being
prosecuted, or at retaining suspects for—possibly more robust—domestic
prosecution); and (iii) the authority of international courts at the domestic level,
in particular the impact international courts have on the jurisprudence as well as
the ability and willingness of domestic jurisdictions to prosecute international
crimes in accordance with international standards.
To illustrate some of these issues, Joensen described various difficulties the
ICTR encountered over its lifetime. These included: the Rwandan government’s
changing stance on cooperation with the Tribunal; problems with the arrest and
transfer of indictees from other African countries; dealing with unforeseen legal
problems, such as compensating for extended pre-trial detention of an ICTR
indictee accused in a foreign country; and the inability of the Tribunal to
investigate cases against Tutsis for political reasons.15 All of these issues
necessitated a certain flexibility from the ICTR—a “principled” flexibility,
Joensen stressed—if it was to carry out its important mandate.
Goldstone then elaborated on a challenge to the authority of the ICC that
came from his home country of South Africa. In 2015, the authorities failed to
15. See generally KATE GIBSON, UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS,
RELIANCE UPON AND COMPLICATIONS WITH STATE COOPERATION, available at
http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/publications/compendium-documents/ii-reliance-complicationsstate-cooperation-gibson.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).

588

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49
arrest Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir when he attended an African Union
summit in Johannesburg.16 The ICC had issued two separate arrest warrants in
2009 and 2010 for President Al Bashir, following a Security Council referral
under Chapter VII, and as a State Party to the Rome Statute, South Africa had an
obligation to cooperate with the Court.17 The South African government decided
instead to honor Al Bashir’s head of state immunity, established under customary
international law.18 The Rome Statute explicitly rejects, however, such
immunity.19 Subsequently, the South African Litigation Centre brought a suit
against the government on this matter to the High Court in Pretoria, which
rejected the government’s position.20 Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of
Appeal, the government was again judged to be in violation—not of its Rome
Treaty obligations but rather the South African legislation passed to carry out the
Rome Treaty domestically in 2002.21 Goldstone wondered if this incident might
suggest that international judges “should have in mind domestic law that is
relevant to their courts when framing requests to governments.”
After the session leaders’ introductory remarks, participants broke into
smaller groups according to their institution’s subject matter jurisdiction—human
rights, interstate dispute resolution, or criminal—to discuss how the experiences
of the ICTR and ICC may or may not be instructive to the participants’ own
everyday realities. If not, then what are their overriding concerns in relation to
institutional authority? They were asked to ponder the following questions: (1)
To what extent should international or regional courts bargain with states in order
to obtain their cooperation?; (2) To what extent should principles be bent in order
to obtain that cooperation?; and (3) How should the judges of those courts react
to criticisms of bias and playing politics? Upon reassembling as a plenary, a
spokesperson for each group summarized their respective conversations.
Human rights judges framed their discussion around the discretionary
powers of their respective benches to “interact” with states found in
violation of their human rights obligations. The question was raised: can
such interactions be considered as “negotiation”? A judge of the African

16. South African Court Rules Failure to Detain Omar al-Bashir Was ‘Disgraceful’, GUARDIAN (Mar.
15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/16/south-african-court-rules-failure-to-detain-omaral-bashir-was-disgraceful (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
17. Norimitsu Onishi, Bid by Omar al-Bashir of Sudan to Avoid Arrest Is Tested in South Africa, N.Y.
TIMES (June 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/world/africa/bashir-sudan-international-criminalcourt-south-africa.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
18. Id.
19. Rome Statute art. 27, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 3.
20. South African Court Rules Failure to Detain Omar al-Bashir Was ‘Disgraceful’, supra note 16.
21. South African Government Loses Appeal over Failure to Arrest Bashir, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2016),
https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFKCN0WH19U?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0 (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).

589

2018 / Brandeis Institute for International Judges
Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) described the situation
of his institution: The Court is called to interact with different actors both
upstream and downstream. The Court is not bargaining; it is calling for
African Union states to be party to the treaty and to file declarations on
allowing individual access to the Court. This is one interaction. The
second interaction is on the budget, and that is done initially with the
ambassadors, and then the ministers. Downstream there are rulings of the
Court, declarations and measures, and judgments.
Judges of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) compared such
interactions to the principle of the “margin of appreciation” found in the
European system.22 Said one ECtHR judge, “[f]rom a sociological perspective,
yes, this is bargaining.” Another opined, “[t]he margin of appreciation has
become unwieldy and large; it prevents principled decisions because the Court
shies away from treading on state toes.”
Judges of interstate dispute resolution courts focused their conversation on
what their institutions can do to enhance their authority. The judges agreed there
are limits on what courts can actually do beyond draft judgments and advisory
opinions that “matter” and speak to the public. One participant was concerned his
institution issued press releases so technical in their language that they are hard
for the media, much less the average layperson, to interpret. He suggested that
the communications department try to “simplify its language so that stakeholders
can understand decisions of the court.” Other judges suggested outreach by their
courts, including workshops and other specialized events, can do much to raise
their profiles in a positive manner. Finally, participants stressed that ensuring
“collegiality and confidentiality” on the bench, especially to protect the opinions
of individual judges, contributes to bolstering institutional authority.
Participants who serve on the benches of international criminal courts and
tribunals discussed whether ad hoc and hybrid courts have more authority than the
permanent ICC. They returned to a topic raised in the first session, that of the
source of an institution’s authority and whether it plays a role in the institution’s
level of authority. The judges collectively concluded, “[w]e need political support
from states.” This led to two follow-up questions: “How much do our courts need
to bargain to maximize this support? And who will do the bargaining?” The
judges noted criminal courts and tribunals comprise not only Chambers but also
Offices of the Prosecutor and Registries. Each of these organs may have a role in
maximizing the support of states for their work.
22. According to the Council of Europe, the parent body of the ECtHR, “The term ‘margin of
appreciation’ refers to the space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national
authorities, in fulfilling their obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.” The Margin of
Appreciation, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/lisbonnetwork/themis/echr/paper2_en.asp
(last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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Session two ended with some general remarks arising from participants’
examination of IC authority. One criminal judge felt the assessment of authority
should take into account the particular circumstances of an institution: “If you are
working in a post-crisis country, you necessarily have less authority.” A judge
from a human rights court noted his institution’s work is so multi-leveled—with
persons, states and NGOs all bringing in their interests—that it is complex to
evaluate. Another added that perceptions of human rights courts depend on which
audience—political, societal, or legal—is assessing its work. A participant who
was a long-time domestic judge before joining an international bench stated an
obvious aim for all judges but one that always bears repeating: “It is vital to
produce good quality judgments that are accessible to the community, clear and
principled.” This may be the most effective and least controversial path to
maximizing the authority of any court.
3. The Role of International Judges in Building a Coherent International Legal
Order
The third session of BIIJ 2016 addressed an issue about which international
judges often express concern: the fragmentation of international legal norms, a
phenomenon that, among other consequences, might decrease the authority of
international courts and tribunals. During this session, led by Judge Dennis Byron,
President of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), and Fausto Pocar, Judge and
past President of the ICTY, participants had the opportunity to examine some
strategies international judges and their institutions can use to reinforce the
coherence of the international legal order.
The potential to fragment international legal norms to undermine this order
has received much attention by scholars over the past decade. Eva Kassoti, for
example, focuses on what she terms “substantive fragmentation,” defined as “the
possibility of divergent interpretations by the plethora of international
adjudicatory bodies interpreting and applying the same substantive law.”23 She
argues substantive fragmentation “poses a threat to adjudicative coherence,
namely the need for consistency in judicial reasoning,”24 and that “judicial
dialogue, in the sense of active engagement with the jurisprudence of other
courts, is an important factor in counteracting substantive fragmentation.”25
Byron described to participants how his court has embraced this idea of
active engagement through “cross-referencing” the jurisprudence of various
international courts and tribunals, both those with similar subject matter

23. Eva Kassoti, Fragmentation and Inter-Judicial Dialogue: The CJEU and the ICJ at the Interface, 8
EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 21, 29 (2015).
24. Id. at 48.
25. Id.
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jurisdictions and those whose jurisprudence derives from a different legal domain
but proves relevant to the elements of a particular case. The CCJ has thus cited
judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as well as those
of regional human rights courts, namely the ECtHR and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).26
Byron then referred to an article by former International Court of Justice (ICJ)
Judge Gilbert Guillaume, who delves further into the idea of shared legal thinking
by examining the use of precedent by international judges and arbitrators.27
International judicial institutions, in general, do not recognize the binding
authority of legal precedent, even in relation to their own jurisprudence. Despite
this position, taking account of previous decisions, to treat persons in comparable
situations as comparable, lends an important predictability to the law. At the same
time, referring to judgments previously made—if only persuasively—in a
mechanical fashion may stifle the law’s development and its need to adapt to the
evolving demands of society. Guillaume notes that an expansion in the number of
international courts and tribunals “not only creates risks of contradictory decisions
in specific cases, but also risks of contradictions of jurisprudence.”28 Guillaume
concludes that “[t]he challenge is to navigate between two risks: that of
jurisprudential incoherence and that of government by judges. Legal precedent in
international dispute settlement is neither to be worshipped nor ignored.”29
In his introductory remarks, Pocar reiterated that predictability is vital if the
public is to have confidence in the application of international law. He suggested
coherence can be pursued not only through reference to established
jurisprudence—whether from one’s own or another court—but also through the
joint development of international customary law. This endeavor is particularly
important for the prosecution of international crimes (war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and torture), which aims to protect values that should be
shared by all mankind. He asked, “[h]ow far is derogation justified when dealing
with crimes that offend the international community as a whole? Can we afford
fragmentation?” He added, in his view, the most important contemporary challenge
for international criminal law is “ensuring effective application of the principle to
fight impunity.”
Pocar noted in closing that while the procedures to protect fundamental values
may vary, the values themselves should be part of a common legal framework. He
had earlier summed up this view in a published article: “An inter-judicial and interinstitutional dialogue ensures that despite apparent inconsistencies in the
application of international criminal law, the proliferation of international
26. See Trinidad Cement Ltd. v. Guyana, Judgment, [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ) (Aug. 20, 2009).
27. See generally Gilbert Guillaume, The Use of Precedent by International Judges and Arbitrators, 2 J.
INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 5 (2011).
28. Id. at 18.
29. Id. at 5.
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jurisdictions will ensure integration and contribute to the evolution of international
human rights and humanitarian law, and therefore contribute to international
customary law.”30
Both session leaders expressed their belief scholars have exaggerated the
specter of fragmentation. International judges understand the need to inform
themselves of relevant jurisprudence issued from other international courts;
indeed, it goes with the job. But this aspect of their work has perhaps not been
sufficiently articulated to the public, nor is it a given that perfect coherence may
ever be achievable in the international legal system.
Entering the discussion period, session leaders asked their fellow judges to
think about the following questions: (1) Should international courts consider that
it is part of their duties to contribute to the coherence of the international legal
order? Or do the history and development of multiple courts suggest that
achieving coherence may be a losing battle?; (2) What is the philosophy or policy
of their own courts in this regard?; and (3) How far can an open dialogue go in
improving the common legal framework of international courts and tribunals?
What are its limitations?
BIIJ participants had many thoughts and experiences to bring to the ensuing
conversation. A criminal judge declared at the outset that, in his opinion,
fragmentation was a real problem and it undermined institutional authority. Such
incoherence in international criminal law was understandable “in the beginning,”
but by now, he continued, there should be more coherence. Another criminal
judge observed for there to be real coherence in the field, newer criminal courts
and tribunals should follow the jurisprudence established by the pioneering ICTY
and ICTR. However, the ICC has declined to do so in several areas, including in
its rulings around the mode of liability termed “joint criminal enterprise.”31
An inter-state dispute resolution judge suggested fragmentation should be
considered a challenge rather than a problem. Inter-court dialogue was desirable,
he stressed, where appropriate. For example, ITLOS and the ICJ held a useful
dialogue on an issue that has engaged both institutions, the delimitation of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Another judge described how the
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) decided in a particular case that it had the
right to interpret the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the primary
legal instrument of the continent-wide ACtHPR.32 Although the possibility of
30. Fausto Pocar, The International Proliferation of Criminal Jurisdictions Revisited: Uniting or
Fragmenting International Law?, in COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY 1705, 1722 (Holger P.
Hestermeyer et al. ed., 2012).
31. Giulia Bigi, Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and the Prosecution of Senior Political and Military Leaders: The Krajišnik Case, 14
MAX PLANCK Y.B. OF U.N. L. 51, 82 (2010).
32. Ally Possi, It’s Official: The East African Court of Justice Can Now Adjudicate Human Rights Cases,
AFRICLAW (Feb. 1, 2016), https://africlaw.com/2016/02/01/its-official-the-east-african-court-of-justice-cannow-adjudicate-human-rights-cases/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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contradicting interpretations of the Charter arose, he accepted that “sometimes
incoherence cannot be avoided.”
The judges also raised the issue of fragmentation within the same institution.
Separate chambers or panels within a single court may apply law in different
ways; consequently, one judge declared, “there also needs to be dialogue within
an institution.” One participant described the Appellate Body’s practice as
exemplary for its capacity to counter internal fragmentation: a panel of three
members sitting on a particular case will have exhaustive discussions around the
relevant law, after which they present, in what is called “an exchange of views,”
their thinking to the other four Appellate Body members, who then play “devil’s
advocates” in order to check the robustness of the panel’s views.33 Through this
exercise, a well-reasoned and common decision is reached in the end.
In response to the idea that the cross-referencing of jurisprudence across
courts will decrease the chance of incoherence, one participant remained
skeptical. Such cross-referencing, in his opinion, is totally “instrumentalized”
because courts cite whatever jurisprudence serves their strategic interest. “This is
troubling,” he continued, “because you cannot build legitimacy by being onesided. Either disregard that side—this is the poor man’s way—or give both sides.
It is best to admit fragmentation and deal honorably with it.”
As to international judges’ duty to contribute to the coherence of
international law, participants also asked what this might mean. “A coherent
system doesn’t mean all decisions go in the same direction,” said one judge.
Another asked, in a more philosophical bent, “[s]hould civilization be
condemned to apply the first expression of law?” He added, “[l]aw must be
dynamic, but the reasoning process must be consistent. That doesn’t mean that
everyone thinks the same way.” Another participant seemed to believe that
seeking coherence at all was unrealistic: “We are in a developing field and there
is no coordination mechanism. It’s a fragmented world and there is no way out of
it!”
All in all, the assembled judges concluded that some people overestimate the
risks of fragmentation, and the perceived need to make international law more
coherent may itself undermine the authority of their institutions by interfering
with the judicial function. Pocar ended the session with this insight: “Different
opinions don’t mean incoherence. When there is incoherence on legal principles,
then you have a problem in the international system.”

33. The Process—Stages in a Typical WTO Dispute Settlement Case, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.
wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s5p3_e.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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4. Internal Aspects of the Functioning of International Courts and Tribunals
BIIJ participants turned their attention in this session to the realities of dayto-day work in their respective institutions. To lead this session, Fatsah
Ouguergouz, Judge of the ACtHPR and former secretary of the ICJ Registry,
joined forces with David Thór Björgvinsson, Professor of Law at the University
of Copenhagen, Faculty of Law, former ECtHR Judge and BIIJ Co-Director.
Their introductory remarks laid out the wide array of factors affecting how
complex judicial bodies function and the implications of less than optimal
practices.
The internal aspects of the functioning of international courts and tribunals
are undoubtedly critical to both their authority and their performance (addressed
in the following section), whatever the type of jurisdiction—human rights,
criminal, interstate dispute resolution, or trade. Indeed, their authority and
performance may mostly be assessed based on the number and quality of the
rulings of these judicial bodies, as well as on their capacity to reply within a
reasonable time to the demands for justice by litigants or parties. These “outputs”
depend, in turn, on various factors and parameters.
Among these factors and parameters, courts categorize some factors and
parameters as “exogenous,” that is, established by parent organizations; they are
therefore outside the control of international judges. These include: the scope of a
court’s or tribunal’s jurisdiction (contentious and advisory); financing and
budgets; the number and choice of judges (nomination and election/appointment
process); the full-time or part-time status of judges; the salaries and honoraria for
judges; access by litigants (compulsory or optional); and the choice of official
languages (one, two, or more). One might also mention the clarity and
preciseness of the institutions’ constitutive acts—about material and personal
jurisdiction, for example—as well as the content of instruments of ratification or
accession, including reservations relating to access by litigants.
Other factors and parameters may be categorized as being “endogenous” and
therefore more or less under the control of international judges themselves. The
long list may include, depending on the court or tribunal in question:
• working methods (rules of procedure and internal judicial practice);
• composition into chambers or sections;
• the role of the president;
• the relationship between judges and the registry (division of work, role
of legal staff);
• influence of registry members on judicial decision-making;
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• number and length of ordinary sessions (for courts with part-time
judges);
• scope of activities (judicial, administrative, budgetary, promotional, or
diplomatic);
• speedy treatment of repetitive cases and pilot judgments;
• measures to secure consistency in case law;
• selection of cases for single judge procedure (where relevant);
• choice of personal working language(s);
• use of technology (case management system or remote access to case
files by judges);
• outreach and communication (with technologies such as Twitter,
Facebook, Flickr, Vimeo, etc.);
• legal aid programs or funds;
• exchange of technical expertise and best practices with other courts and
tribunals; training of judges and staff;
• relationships with civil society stakeholders; and, last but not least,
• dedication of judges to their work.
Given the length and breadth of this list of endogenous factors, the session
leaders suggested that participants focus on some that are essential for ensuring
optimal institutional authority. They considered those to be: relationships among
members of the bench; the role and structure of the registry, including its
relations with judges; and relationships between courts and tribunals and their
key stakeholders. Participants were exceptionally open in their remarks during
the discussion period, especially regarding what does not work well within their
institutions. The summary below scrupulously respects the confidentiality of
participants and thus is more general than the conversation upon which it is
based.
Participants began by describing the level of collegiality and cooperation
existing among members of their benches. The Appellate Body practice of
institutionalized consultation with all members in the formulation of a single
decision was once again presented as a model of collegiality. Several participants
bemoaned the fact that some judges were clearly better than others in terms of both
their knowledge and their willingness to pull their weight. “Individuals do count”
was the general feeling of participants (see a later section of this report for more on
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this issue). The character of the judge who presides over a particular case is also
important, particularly in a criminal case where he or she controls the conduct of
proceedings. A “weak” judge may lead to a slow trial. As one participant noted, “a
qualified judge is not always a quality judge.” Participants mentioned the need for
reforms in the nomination and election processes of international judges. As one
participant said, “[t]he quality of judges makes the difference between a court that
is respected and deemed credible or not.”
Several participants also raised the troubling “de-responsibilization” of
judges in certain courts. This can be seen through the increasingly important role
of legal assistants in the work of chambers, even in substantively shaping draft
judgments, a task usually considered to be the primary responsibility of judges.
Participants from criminal institutions defended a certain dependence on these
staff members, explaining that legal assistants play the vital role of sifting
through mounds of evidence and helping on the small procedural decisions that
may render the workload of criminal judges extremely heavy. Several
participants mentioned the important reality that legal staff are often long-time
employees of a court or tribunal, and thus may carry the institutional memory and
have a better familiarity with its practices than judges who necessarily come and
go. Despite this important input of legal staff, a participant insisted, “[i]t is
important for the credibility and authority of courts that judges bear
responsibility for decisions. Staff members do not have accountability.” Another
participant concurred: “If courts are inefficient, judges are responsible. If it
doesn’t work, judges should change it!”
Discussion then moved to the registries of international courts and tribunals
and the central role they play in their functioning. As one very experienced
international judge noted, “[t]he registry has a tremendous impact on the
perception of a court.” Despite a general recognition of all that a registry does,
participants expressed many and varied frustrations about their respective
administrative branches. These included: the control exerted by registries in some
courts over provision of legal assistants, so that they are not answerable to the
judges they assist; the ability of the registry, in institutions where it assigns
judges to cases, to purposefully deploy judges perceived as “conservative” or
“radical” to influence judicial decision-making; a registry’s ability to impose
shape on the development of case law in institutions where it produces draft
judgments; the registry’s attempt to “second guess” a judge’s decision about an
accused person’s need for legal aid, presumably for budgetary reasons; the need
to thwart the “imperialist tendencies” of certain individual registrars; and more
generally, the undue influence and power of registry staff who may be long-term
employees of a court or tribunal. While participants did not offer any concrete
strategies for resolving such conflicts between chambers and registries, they
appreciated the opportunity to articulate their misgivings about various aspects of
this relationship, one that is fundamental to the smooth functioning of any court
or tribunal.
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Finally, BIIJ participants turned to the question of how their institutions
reach out to stakeholders. Many international courts and tribunals have
dedicated units that take care of this important function. The most elaborate
outreach program may be the ICC’s, with six “field offices” in situation
countries and a liaison office in New York City. In this way, the Court
attempts to have positive relationships with states, populations affected by
crimes, and relevant NGOs. Judges from other jurisdictions weighed into the
discussion, describing how their institutions attempt to communicate their
work to various audiences, be it through press releases, publication of
judgments and law reports, public speeches, or promotional activities in
member states. There was some feeling that court presidents may be called
upon to have a more public persona vis-à-vis stakeholders. One president in
attendance wondered, however, what the limits of appropriate engagement
with the public might be and if there was a point beyond which an institution’s
authority might be compromised by exchanges with stakeholders. Participants
also mentioned outreach activities designed to “drum up business,” which
underutilized newer courts sometimes use. Such a strategy contrasts with that
of a court like the ECtHR, which instead looks to slow down the flow of cases
to decrease its backlog.
The aspects of internal functioning addressed in this session, and their
implications for how courts and tribunals carry out their mandates, led naturally
into the following one that took on the complicated question of how to evaluate
the performance of international courts and tribunals.
5. Evaluating the Performance of International Courts and Tribunals
The authority of international courts and tribunals had already been
examined through a variety of lenses during BIIJ 2016, from using a somewhat
abstract sociological model to considering what judges themselves can do to
improve their everyday functioning as well as bolster the coherence of the legal
system in which their institutions operate. Participants now turned to a critical
question that is inevitably linked, in the minds of many, with how authoritative
international courts and tribunals are perceived to be—how well do they
perform? This session was co-led by Richard Goldstone and Christine Van den
Wyngaert, Judge of the ICC and former Judge of the ICTY. They used a recent
“performance self-evaluation” conducted by the ICC as a launching point.
Van den Wyngaert began her introductory remarks by noting that assessing
the performance of international courts and tribunals has become a topical issue
in recent years. A crucial question at the outset of any such evaluation is how to
define the concept of performance itself. Evaluating an international court’s
performance cannot simply be a matter of calculating profit margins, as with
private companies, or even conviction rates and workloads, as with national
judicial systems. If it is “hard to put a price on justice,” then this applies a fortiori
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to international justice, she declared. This is why courts have been trying to
develop “performance indicators,” which will allow them to measure their
performance. At the ICC, all the organs of the Court (judges, prosecutors, and
members of the registry) recently engaged in a court-wide exercise to develop
such indicators. Van den Wyngaert observed that this was a fascinating exercise,
and one which proved more difficult than expected at the outset. They learned
that it is indeed difficult to measure the work of a court.
Participants noted there has been a lot of recent scholarly work on the
performance of international courts and tribunals, and different models have been
used to analyze their performance. The nature of these models, however, is such
that only quantifiable aspects of the court’s work are capable of meaningful
assessment. The most common models for analysis were then discussed and
critiqued.
a) The compliance rate approach looks at the degree of compliance by
parties with court orders made against them. By this token, the
higher the compliance rate, the more successful the international
court or tribunal. It is one of the few variables that is capable of
being quantified. The problem with this model is that compliance
may relate to extra-legal factors and may have nothing to do with the
quality of the ruling. For criminal courts, a further problem is that
they rely almost completely on the cooperation of states at all
possible levels: execution of arrest warrants, evidence gathering, the
conduct of investigations, and the enforcement of sentences. The
ICC has faced non-compliance problems, notably in the failure by
states to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir from Sudan, as
discussed in Session two by Richard Goldstone. Reliance on
signatory states for the functioning of the Court therefore attaches
too high a price to cooperation and non-cooperation and may be too
narrow a test for measuring the ICC’s performance. The compliance
rates approach therefore does not seem to be suitable for all
international courts.
b) The usage rates approach refers to the extent of the court’s
workload. Applying this model to international courts may be very
different from one court to another. For example, the ICJ was hardly
used during the Cold War years. At the celebration of the 70th
anniversary of the ICJ on April 20, 2016, many speakers praised the
fact that, in recent years, the workload had considerably increased,
which had made the court more relevant and important as the
principal judicial organ of the UN. By comparison, the usage model
as applied to the ICC begs the question: usage by whom? This is in
view of the triggering mechanisms under the statute which can be
599

2018 / Brandeis Institute for International Judges
States, the Security Council, but also the Prosecutor acting proprio
motu. At the ICC, which is based on the complementarity principle,
less “usage” of the court may mean that complementarity is working
and that investigations and prosecutions are effectively taking place
on the national level. For the ICC, in an ideal world, it should have
no work at all. Like the compliance model, the usage model does not
seem to be an adequate model for measuring the performance of all
international courts and tribunals.
c) The goal-based approach looks at whether and how a court
effectively fulfils the mandate set out in its charter. This model was
originally applied to private companies and NGOs to measure their
effectiveness and is now proposed by one of the leading authors in
the field, Yuval Shany, to measure the performance of international
courts and tribunals.34 This model considers the fact that several
goals may exist simultaneously. In doing so, it allows for a more
nuanced assessment of the performance of an institution.
Interestingly, and perhaps most problematically for international
courts, is the fact that, in contrast to private companies or even
national (criminal) justice systems, there may be disagreement about
the court’s goals.
Thus, before answering the question whether an international court or tribunal
is attaining its goals, a preliminary normative question is what should these goals
be? There are many problems with this. Some goals, particularly ultimate goals,
may be vague and thus open to interpretation. What Shany defines as “goal
ambiguity” may therefore leave too much room for irreconcilable views on the
perceived goals of the court. The diverse number of stakeholders in any one
international court or tribunal means that entirely dichotomous goals may exist
with little chance of these being reconciled. Also, the precise time frame for the
attainment of goals is especially difficult to gauge. Of particular importance to
infant courts is the extent to which one can use the first years of a court’s
existence to gauge levels of performance in the long term in light of inevitable
“teething problems.”
There can also be a divergence between performance measurement from an
internal perspective (i.e. by actors and stakeholders from inside the institution)
and performance measurement from an external perspective (i.e. by actors and
stakeholders from outside the institution). The ICC suffers from such divergence.
Its most important goals from the inside are ending impunity by increasing
accountability of state officials for international crimes, deterrence or prevention
34. See generally YUVAL SHANY, ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS (Ruth
Mackenzie et al. ed., 2014).
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of these crimes, ensuring international peace and security, enhancing
international cooperation in the prosecution of international crimes, and
guaranteeing lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice.
However, the common goals projected on the ICC from the outside may be quite
different, coming from states parties, accused persons, victims’ groups, and
various NGOs. “It is important to consider the question of acceptance in situation
countries,” Van den Wyngaert stressed. The fact that the work of the ICTY did
not result in a shared narrative about the Balkan conflict in Serbia, Croatia, and
Bosnia points, she believes, to a failing of the Tribunal. She contrasted this with
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which
succeeded in establishing a common narrative about that country’s apartheid era.
Van den Wyngaert then noted that the divergence between internal and
external goals may be more extreme for the ICC and other criminal institutions
than for other types of international and regional jurisdictions. However, she
believes that it is important for all international courts and tribunals to consider
the external perspective when they attempt to measure their own performance.
She also applauded the iCourts’ model discussed in Session 1 for utilizing the
external impact of ICs as one of the ways to determine their authority.
Goldstone then opened the discussion period of the session with the
following two questions: (1) Should judges be involved in assessing the
performance of their respective institutions? If yes, how?; and (2) What are the
performance indicators that are relevant for judges’ respective courts or
tribunals? A lively and wide-ranging conversation ensued.
Judges from criminal institutions identified with the tension between internal
and external performance indicators experienced at the ICC. One participant
observed that criminal tribunals operate in an extremely political environment,
and some prosecutors take positions motivated by extraneous considerations,
such as the victims’ interests or balance between ethnic groups. He recommended
the exercise of caution: “If we play to constituencies, we lose the credibility that
the international community is willing to accord us. The mandate of a judge must
be to decide guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If we go beyond that, there is a
problem.” He contrasted a criminal tribunal to the South African TRC, which
could seek other outcomes as it was not a purely judicial entity.
Participants pointed out that criminal tribunals are often evaluated by insiders
and parent organizations on the expeditiousness and fairness of their proceedings.
A participant declared that the ICTY trials represent the “gold standard” of
fairness, even though proceedings were often protracted. Another observed that
the participation of victims in ICC trials—a development lauded by external
stakeholders—will inevitably slow down the proceedings. “That’s where I see a
discrepancy between what an internal and external assessment might be,” he said.
In other words, pleasing the victim “audience” may compromise the Court’s
performance from the point of view of internal stakeholders. A judge with
experience in a hybrid criminal institution expressed his view that judges should
601

2018 / Brandeis Institute for International Judges
organize proceedings for efficiency as they see fit and then assess their own
performance against the standards they set. “As for how their work is assessed
externally, that is up to scholars to do.”
Judges in interstate dispute resolution institutions shared some of the views
of criminal judges. In speaking of the Appellate Body experience, a participant
presented several benchmarking goals: first of all, the “prompt and fair resolution
of disputes,” but also “avoidance of disputes” that may arise from disagreements
around what constitutes compliance with past rulings. Another external
stakeholder issue is access to the Appellate Body by some member states. It
might cost upwards of $1 million to have a case adjudicated, so there is now
assistance for poorer countries to file disputes.
A member of a regional court opined that “performance improves when there
are standards.” Judges should then be intimately connected to assessment
procedures and undertake reforms if specific milestones are not met. A colleague
from another regional court agreed, adding that such assessment should remain
confidential. “You don’t want a document appraising what you do, and then have
the temptation to make it more appealing to the outside world.” If individual
judges are found to be the source of inefficiencies, then this needs to be worked
out internally.
Responding to the assertion that speed of adjudication should be a primary
indicator of success, an interstate dispute resolution judge noted that this criterion
only goes so far. “Let’s not lose sight of the most important theme, which is the
substantive quality of our judgments, the rational outcome of our cases.” He
admitted that this benchmark is, however, hard to measure. Another participant
pointed out that the way individual judges approach deliberation influences
performance. He asked, “[d]o they keep an open mind till the end?” A judge
countered that in criminal jurisdictions, “there is a clash of judicial philosophy—
civil law wants the truth, and common law just wants to know if the Prosecutor
proved the case.” Participants also raised the need for courts to “express
[judgments] in a language the [stakeholder] community can understand.. And
once again, participants suggested that external parties be involved in the
assessment of judges’ arguments.
Human rights judges then brought in the perspective of their institutions,
which are charged with establishing standards across wide and diverse regions.
Sometimes their benches must consider what is “realistic” and whether their
rulings can be enforced. Returning to the standard of the speedy resolution of
cases, participants pointed out that the ECtHR seems to have sacrificed
transparency for expeditiousness. Under pressure from the Council of Europe
(COE) to decrease its case backlog, most cases are now resolved by a single
judge who produces no opinion laying out a legal argument. This makes an
assessment of the Court’s output by external actors more difficult. But in any
case, a participant observed, the COE seems more interested in the number of
cases won than in the legal rationale behind rulings.
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Another human rights judge said of his younger institution, “Number and
quality should not be the only yardsticks.” He observed that his court is involved
in enhancing the rule of law across its broad jurisdiction. “Think of human rights
and justice as two beautiful flowers, which cannot develop in poor soil. Our court
is fertilizing the soil.” He urged his colleagues not to overlook how their
institutions relate to civil society, national judiciaries, and national human rights
commissions when assessing their performance.
Over the course of this discussion on performance, participants also brought
up several issues of recurring interest and concern to international judges, issues
that have been addressed during past Brandeis Institutes. These included:
whether there should be a general code of conduct for international judges;
methods for removing a problematic judge from an international bench; how
term limits and considerations of post-service employment may affect the
independence and performance of judges; and the need to vet nominees for
international judicial positions and de-politicize their election/appointment so
that the most qualified individuals can join the international bench.
Mikael Rask Madsen noted, as the session ended, that BIIJ participants had
“come full circle” by linking the notion of how the external community views
international courts with how judges themselves assess their work. Both are
critical in understanding the authority of international courts and tribunals and
the reception and ultimate impact of their rulings.
CONTRIBUTIONS BY ICOURTS AND BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY TO THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
1. The iCourts Research Agenda and Presentation of Findings by Two
Affiliated Researchers
Mikael Rask Madsen opened this part of the institute with a general
introduction to iCourts and its principal research areas. He explained that iCourts
supports pioneering studies that systematically explore the new role of
international courts in the global order. These studies aim to examine how
international courts significantly change the law across substantive areas of
international law, and how they transform the interface of law and politics both
nationally and internationally. The Center is particularly interested in issues
related to the authority of international courts. In this regard, it develops research
around three key issues—the institutionalization, autonomization, and
legitimization of international courts. The iCourts working paper series
demonstrates the broad range of scholarship on international courts and tribunals
that the institution has supported to date.
As an example of the kinds of work that iCourts-affiliated scholars are doing,
Madsen introduced recent projects by Urška Šadl and Federico Fabbrini, both
Associate Professors of Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen.
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The scholars then had the opportunity to speak in depth about their projects and
take questions and comments from the assembled international judges.
1.1 Research on the Court of Justice of the European Union
Šadl presented on the topic “Do International Courts Make Law in Small
Steps? The Case of the European Court of Justice.” She contended that one of the
reasons for the success of the CJEU is its use of “principled incrementalism,” a
step-by-step judicial decision-making that strives for a workable balance between
societal and legal concerns. Šadl explained that principled incrementalism allows
courts to consciously or unconsciously balance the demands of the individual
case against the demands of the whole body of law, in particular legal coherence
and consistency. This ultimately lets them preserve the authority to interpret legal
norms in the long run.35
In the case of international courts, such balancing is additionally constrained
by the increased political pressure from various states with dissimilar legal
systems, conflicting political interests, varying degrees of international
commitment, and the absence of a central enforcement mechanism that makes
international courts particularly vulnerable and dependent on cooperation by
powerful political actors.36 Šadl argued that by constructing its legal doctrines in
a series of small steps, the CJEU has avoided political conflict and significant
push back from the legal community.37
The main findings of her study demonstrate that the CJEU’s use of principled
incrementalism can be seen through its own citation patterns.38 There is a
significant delay—on average more than eleven years—between the handing
down of an important decision and the moment when it starts to have significant
effect on subsequent case law.39 This “gestation period” is even longer for cases
that introduce new doctrines or principles, versus cases that further develop or
entrench them.40 These findings suggest that the CJEU has been careful not to
immediately apply its newly established principles, especially in cases with
symbolic rather than practical importance.41 Further, qualitative examination
shows that when the CJEU introduces or extends its doctrines, it often mitigates
the effects of the judgment by decoupling the abstract rule or principle from its

35. See generally Urška Šadl, The Role of Effet Utile in Preserving the Continuity and Authority of
European Union Law: Evidence from the Citation Web of the Pre-accession Case Law of the Court of Justice of
the EU, 8 EUR. J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (2015).
36. Id. at 22.
37. Id. at 20.
38. Id. at 26.
39. Id. at 33.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 42.
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effects (remedy from the principle), or delaying its effects.42 On this basis, it can
be argued that the CJEU develops its doctrines in a step-by-step fashion, as
predicted by the theory of principled incrementalism.43
Šadl’s analysis contributes to a lively debate on judicial authority and lawmaking of international courts in Europe and beyond,44 an investigation that is
relevant also because of the increasing normative, interpretative, and political
authority of international courts.45 Importantly, it adds to the existing literature,
first by demonstrating empirically how international courts make international
law and, second, by providing a deeper insight into the long-term maintenance
rather than establishment of (legitimate) supranational judicial authority.46
1.2 Research on the European Human Rights System
Federico Fabbrini discussed his recent monograph Fundamental Rights in
Europe: Challenges and Transformations in Comparative Perspective.47 The
book argues that, today, fundamental rights on the continent are simultaneously
protected at the levels of States, the European Union, and the European
Convention on Human Rights.48 The book aims to analyze the implications of
this multilevel architecture and examine the dynamics that spring from the
interaction between different human rights standards in Europe.49
To this end, the book adopts a comparative approach: departing from
prevailing literature in the field, the book explains that the European system is
not exceptional and develops a comparison with the federal system of the United
States of America.50 In a comparative perspective, the book identifies two
recurrent challenges in the interplay between different state and transnational
human rights standards—a challenge of ineffectiveness and a challenge of
inconsistency.51 It explains that these challenges arise when transnational law

42. Id. at 29.
43. Id. at 20.
44. See generally INGO VENZKE, HOW INTERPRETATION MAKES INTERNATIONAL LAW: ON SEMANTIC
CHANGE AND NORMATIVE TWISTS (2012); MARC JACOB, PRECEDENTS AND CASE-BASED REASONING IN THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: UNFINISHED BUSINESS (2014); Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, In Whose
Name? An Investigation of International Courts’ Public Authority and Its Democratic Justification, 23 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 7 (2012).
45. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS,
RIGHTS (2014).
46 Šadl, supra note 35, at 21.
47. See generally FEDERICO FABBRINI, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND
TRANSFORMATIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca eds., 2014).
48. Id. at 1.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2.
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operates either as a floor or as a ceiling of protection for a specific human right.52
In addition, the book maps the most important transformations taking place
in the European system and assesses their impact on these challenges.53 In an
empirical part, the book considers four case studies: (1) the right to due process
for suspected terrorists; (2) the right to vote for non-citizens; (3) the right to
strike; and (4) the right to abortion.54 On the basis of these case studies, the book
reconsiders the main scholarly theories on the protection of fundamental rights in
Europe: sovereigntism and pluralism.55 It questions their validity and claims that
the European system needs to take steps toward a new theoretical framework,
which—for its capacity to reconcile the dilemmas of identity, equality and
supremacy—will partake of a “neo-federal” vision.56
1.3 What are potential benefits of academic research for members of the
international judiciary?
This session aimed not only to expose international judges to recent and
ongoing scholarship on international courts and law but also to create a dialogue
between scholars and practitioners. International judges were asked what kinds of
academic research they, as practicing judges, find most relevant or instructive for
their work.
First, several judges responded to various points made by Šadl and Fabbrini.
A criminal judge wondered how to define what constitutes a “leading case”
whose influence can subsequently be tracked. He suggested that the ICTY Tadić
judgment could be put in this category, as it was later “quoted everywhere.”
Another judge queried Šadl about how the CJEU’s decisions may or may not be
in sync with those of the ECtHR, given their overlapping regional jurisdictions
but different legal foundations. She asked, “How do you not conflict and also
develop law incrementally, without stepping on toes?” Šadl responded that courts
do sometimes step on toes, so they need “to cite each other politely and
respectfully.”
In reference to Fabbrini’s presentation, several judges asked for clarification
on his notions of transnational law acting as either a “floor” or “ceiling” for
human rights protections. Can an international court actually impose a ceiling and
require a state to lower its existing protections to meet that standard? If so, how is
this reconciled with the European Convention on Human Rights? A human rights
judge wondered where economic and social rights fit into Fabbrini’s model.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
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Fabbrini responded that the Court is “creatively interpreting Article 1157 to bring
social rights back in and expand them.” A second human rights judge commented
that he sometimes felt like the ECtHR “opted for the lowest level” of protection.
He gave as an example the court’s refusal to raise the standard on the right to
abortion, given strict legislation on this issue in certain member states. A third
human rights judge pointed out, “the low protection of one thing allows the high
protection of another,” and that “conventions are tools of priorities.” Finally, a
judge countered the ECtHR is, after all, “antidemocratic” in the way it requires
certain standards across the Council of Europe despite the existence of local
opposition. He opined that it is sometimes appropriate that “courts not become too
authoritative.”
The discussion then moved on to the place of scholarly publications in the
work of international judges. A judge, and former professor, observed, “the
impact of academia on international judges is less than I expected before
becoming one.” Another judge noted that in his court, scholarly articles are
seldom cited because judges “don’t want to privilege Professor X against
Professor Z.” Thus, their legal writing becomes very “self-referential.” A
criminal judge added that “judges in international criminal law don’t feel
comfortable citing academics as authorities; they are much more comfortable
citing other courts.” Another criminal judge expressed some frustration that
academics are not interested in judges’ evaluations of their own work—“the
attitude of some academics is that we should shut up and let them assess our
accomplishments.” “There is danger in academics trying to influence process,”
added a participant.
Notwithstanding recognized restraints around the citation of scholarly
publications, several participants emphasized the important role academic
research plays in their work. One declared, “[t]he reality is that academics are not
far from the judiciary. Rather, judges, bar associations, and the academy are all
part of the legal firmament.” He went on to make a plea for academics to see
themselves as “part of the exercise.” Judges also recognized the important role of
expert knowledge in legal proceedings that involve certain scientific matters,
intellectual property, or other specialized fields. Some participants believed
having libraries in courts is essential, although sometimes administrators seek to
eliminate them because they consider them unnecessary.
iCourts’ scholars then weighed in on this subject. Madsen noted that iCourts’
research shows the foundation between academics and practitioners is “strong
and patterned.” He also emphasized that ongoing connections between the two
groups can keep judicial outputs from becoming, as one judge had earlier phrased
57. Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the freedom of assembly and
association. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 11, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 2889, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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it, “self-referential.” Fabbrini suggested, “academics can develop a common
language of ideas and facilitate communication,” which creates paradigms that
allow judges to perform better. Šadl observed judges and scholars seem to
sometimes struggle over who has ultimate authority on the law: “Both judges and
academics engage. Judges contribute by issuing well written opinions, and then
academics do the empirical analysis.”
A final question arose during this session that engendered some lively
responses. Given the nature of much research on judicial opinions and systems, is
there an assumption that “international judges are essentially interchangeable
parts”? In other words, does it matter which individual judges sit on particular
courts? One president declared, “[w]e want to matter. And, perhaps unfortunately,
individual judges do matter.” This participant noted the frequent circulation of
judges on and off the bench, and suggested that the institution needed to “develop a
homogeneous judicial culture” that would unite judges from different countries and
backgrounds. Another participant concurred, saying an individual judge’s role in
developing law is critical, especially in international criminal institutions. This can
be clearly seen in the development of law around rape and genocide, for example.
He added, “But judges hesitate to speak about this law-making function, and we
cannot discuss it in any public forum.”
2. The Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project
Leigh Swigart and Daniel Terris of Brandeis University then had the
opportunity to introduce BIIJ participants to the Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History
Project, initiated in Fall 2014 by the International Center for Ethics, Justice and
Public Life.58 The Project “seeks to capture the memories, perspectives[,] and
reflections of the individuals who participated in and observed the rapid
institution building that occurred during the early years of the ICTY and ICTR.”
The Project chose an oral history approach to document the Ad Hoc
Tribunal’s development for its potential to contribute perspectives and
understandings that have not emerged either through legal scholarship about the
Tribunals or their own extensive jurisprudence.59 Oral history interviews preserve
the voices of individual actors who worked to bring justice to Rwanda and the
former Yugoslavia, and who contributed to the development and
“institutionalization” of international criminal law during the early years of the
ICTY and ICTR.60 The Project also seeks insight into what the Ad Hoc Tribunals

58. See generally Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project, BRANDEIS U., http://www.brandeis.
edu/ethics/internationaljustice/oral-history/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
59. See generally id.
60. Id.
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have and have not been able to achieve.61 The Project aims to produce an
archived collection that will allow honest analysis, now and into the future, of the
challenges and successes of the Tribunals.62
As of the BIIJ’s 2016 report (April 2017), “the Project had interviewed 30
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, administrators, and other staff connected to
the ICTY and ICTR, as well as commentators on international criminal law.”63
The Project website provides profile pages for each interviewee, downloadable
individual transcripts, and a link to the Brandeis Institutional Repository64 where
a search across the entire collection can be made. Full transcripts of these
interviews will be available by summer 2017.65 Several video clips are also
available on the website.66 These video clips are based on selected excerpts from
the interviews and have been produced to provide a “window” into the kinds of
perspectives and memories that can be retrieved through an oral history
approach.67
Brandeis believes documenting the early years of the Ad Hoc Tribunals is
important for several reasons:
•

The creation of the ICTY and ICTR represents a critical
development in the roles and responsibilities of the international
community in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, a development
that informs global action today and underscores the need to
establish the rule of law and human rights protections everywhere.68

•

Individuals and institutions—from advocates and scholars to the ICC
and other contemporary or future international criminal tribunals—
"can learn important lessons from an archive documenting the
innovative work that started at the ICTY and ICTR and is now given
fuller expression through “successor” institutions.”69

61. See generally id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally BRANDEIS INSTITUTIONAL REPOSITORY, https://bir.brandeis.edu/handle/10192/30830
(last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
65 See generally Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project- Interview Collection, BRANDEIS U.,
https://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/internationaljustice/oral-history/interviews/index.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
66 See generally Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project- Video Clips, BRANDEIS U.,
https://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/internationaljustice/oral-history/video-clips.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017)
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
67. Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project, supra note 58.
68. Id.
69. See id.
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•

As a primary resource, this growing collection of oral history
transcripts can be used in a variety of ways to inform the public
about the Ad Hoc Tribunals and international criminal justice more
generally. Students, scholars, and educators can use the materials in
their research and analysis, in written histories of international
criminal tribunals, and in studies across disciplines such as human
rights, criminal law, sociology, history, and international relations.70

•

The collection will be particularly powerful when used for
educational purposes in post-conflict societies. The interviews
convey, in an evocative manner, the dedication, commitment, hard
work, and innovation of individuals who believe in the international
criminal justice’s capacity to bring about accountability and
reconciliation in societies affected by mass violence and human
rights violations.71

Further, Brandeis contends that exploring international courts and tribunals
through the subjective views and specific experiences of individual actors can act
as a complement to more analytical and objective approaches to these institutions
and their work. Such an approach is not uncommon to social scientists working
on issues of the law.72 But the unscripted and narrator-driven oral history
interview has, in particular, the potential to bring forth unexpected and powerful
stories about judicial institutions, including those pertaining to how they function
internally, how they are perceived from the exterior, and ways in which they are
understood to exert authority.73
This latter point was perhaps most germane to BIIJ 2016’s “authority theme.”
One question inspired by the Project is whether new kinds of narratives about
international courts and tribunals can bolster their legitimacy and/or authority by
showing constituents how they operate, especially at levels that are not normally
visible to the outsider. As noted by Alter et al., “Constituency support is a key
determinant of IC authority.”74
Session leaders asked judges to ponder these questions: (1) What can an
investigation of the stories of individual actors—especially those who are “under
the radar”—contribute to relevant constituencies’ understanding and appreciation
of international courts and tribunals?; (2) What are the benefits and risks of
70. See id.
71. See generally id.
72. See, e.g., RICHARD ASHBY WILSON, WRITING HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
(2011); Salvatore Caserta & Mikael Rask Madsen, Between Community Law and Common Law: the Rise of the
Caribbean Court of Justice at the Intersection of Regional Integration and Post-Colonial Legacies, 79 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 90 (2016).
73. See generally Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral History Project, supra note 58.
74. Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 1, at 22.
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giving voice to new perspectives on international courts and tribunals, not all of
which may be positive? Might the authority of international courts and tribunals
be undermined instead of reinforced by such “unfiltered” narratives?; and (3)
Does the “official narrative” about participants’ courts and tribunals—controlled
by the institutions themselves, or as presented through their jurisprudential output
or by legal scholars—leave out something the public should know in order to
believe in their legitimacy and authority?
International judges had a number of reactions to the Ad Hoc Tribunals Oral
History Project after having read several excerpts, viewed selected video clips,
and listened to a presentation of its aims and methods. Many expressed the view
that it was valuable in principle. One judge noted that such an archive “will be
useful in history writing and as guidance to future participants in new courts.”
Another commended the project, saying it was “important for posterity to see the
lessons learned and the people involved in the Ad Hocs.”
At the same time, some of the criminal judges in attendance expressed
concern about the possible impact of “problematic” narratives on the Ad Hoc
Tribunals’ legacy. They reacted, in particular, to the excerpt of an interview with
an ICTR defense counsel who felt the Tribunal had not supported defense work
as fully as that of prosecutors. It was suggested that, moving forward, the Project
seek to balance viewpoints across the collection by carefully selecting
interviewees. The importance of having a wide representation of nationalities and
backgrounds among interviewees was stressed as well. Several participants also
wondered if a series of questions could be formalized so a standard number of
areas could be covered during interviews.
Swigart and Terris took note of these points, and explained they hoped to see
the Project move into a second phase, where they could consider these
suggestions. They reiterated to the group, however, that conducting an oral
history interview is different than a study where researchers explore predetermined areas of inquiry and strive for consistency when they engage with
research subjects. While interviewers for the Ad Hoc Tribunals project prepared
a number of questions in advance for narrators—based upon those narrators’
professional positions and biographies—they also allowed narrators to
foreground the aspects of their experience that were personally significant and
salient. The resultant oral history collection thus comprises a disparate range of
subjects and viewpoints around its principal theme, some of which will inevitably
be at odds with the “official narrative” of the Tribunals as presented through their
jurisprudence, outreach initiatives, and the messaging of MICT—the Tribunals’
residual mechanism institution. Brandeis believes this richness and complexity is
an important part of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ “story,” and that the collection will
constitute a valuable primary resource for researchers whose future areas of
inquiry cannot be foreseen.
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PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES
Judges
David Baragwanath (New Zealand) is an Appellate Judge of the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, where he served as President for three and one-half years.
He practiced in New Zealand as Queen’s Counsel and was a judge of the High
Court. He later became a permanent member of the Court of Appeal.75 He was
President of the New Zealand Law Commission, presiding judge of the Court of
Appeal of Samoa, and a New Zealand Member of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration.76 He is a graduate of the Universities of Auckland and Oxford, an
Honorary Professor of the University of Waikato, and an Overseas Bencher of
the Inner Temple.77 He has had visiting appointments at universities in England,
the USA, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands.78 He has adjudicated, lectured, and
written extensively on subjects including private and public international law
(including international criminal law and terrorism), administrative law,
commercial law (he is a member of the Advisory Board of the Dutch charity
P.R.I.M.E. Finance, concerned with dispute resolution in complex financing
transactions), judicial cooperation, and other aspects of the common law.79
Olivier Beauvallet (France) assumed his duties as a Judge in the Pre-Trial
Chamber at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in April
2015, after serving as Reserve Co-Investigative Judge.80 He was previously a
prosecutor within the EU Special Investigative Task Force and a prosecutor
within the special prosecution office of the EULEX mission in Kosovo.81 There,
he was in charge of various cases related to organized crime, war crimes, and
terrorism.82 Previously an investigative judge in France, he recently served in a
special court for organized crime based in the French West Indies (special court
for organized crime in Fort-de-France).83 He has participated in “various
international projects in the Balkans, Africa, and Central Asia.”84 Following his
75. Appeals Chamber Judge – Judge Sir Davis Baragwanath, SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON,
https://www.stl-tsl.org/en/about-the-stl/biographies/judges-of-the-special-tribunal-for-lebanon/366-appealschamber-judge-judge-sir-david-baragwanath/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Judge Olivier Beauvallet, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS CTS. CAMBODIA, https://www.eccc.gov.
kh/en/persons/judge-olivier-beauvallet (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Ph.D. in law (EHESS Paris), Judge Beauvallet has authored various books and
articles on both criminal and international criminal law, and he oversaw the
Traité Pratique de l’Instruction—a guide to the practice of investigative
judges.“85 He leads various trainings and seminars in l’École Nationale de la
Magistrature (National Judiciary School), l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences
Sociales (Paris), and many other law schools.”86
Ujal Singh Bhatia (India) has been a member of the World Trade
Organization since December 2011.87 He was elected Chair of the Appellate
Body and assumed this position in January 2017.88 He was India’s Ambassador
and Permanent Representative to the WTO from 2004 to 2010, and represented
India in a number of dispute settlement cases.89 He also served as a WTO dispute
settlement panelist from 2007-2008.90 Mr. Bhatia has also served as Joint
Secretary in the Indian Ministry of Commerce, apart from two decades at Orissa
State in various fields and state-level administrative assignments that involved
development administration and policy-making.91 His legal and adjudicatory
experience spans over three decades and focuses on domestic and international
legal/jurisprudence issues, negotiation of trade agreements and policy issues at
the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels, as well as the implementation of
trade and development policies in the agriculture, manufacturing, and service
industries.92 Mr. Bhatia has often lectured on international trade issues and has
published numerous papers and articles on a wide range of trade and economic
topics. “93 He holds an M.A. in Economics from the University of Manchester
and from Delhi University, as well as a B.A. (Hons) in Economics, also from
Delhi University.”94
Solomy Bossa (Uganda) has 18 years’ experience as a judge with exposure
in international judicial practice, international human rights, international
criminal law, international humanitarian law, and constitutional law at the

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Appellate Body Members Ujal Singh Bhatia, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_bio_e.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2017) (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
88. Appellate Body Members, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ab_members_descrp_e.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
89. Appellate Body Members Ujal Singh Bhatia, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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national, regional, and international levels.95 She has served as Judge of the High
Court of Uganda, the East African Court of Justice, and the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.96 She is currently a judge of the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the United Nations Mechanism for
International Criminal Tribunals, and the Court of Appeal of Uganda.97 Judge
Bossa has advanced the status of women, the rights of victims of simple and
grave international crimes, and human rights abuses.98 She has published papers
and made presentations on varied legal issues.99 As a human rights activist since
1980, she has founded/chaired many non-profit organizations, including the East
African Law Society; Kituo cha Katiba, the Uganda Network on HIV/AIDS,
Ethics, and the Law; and the National Organization for Civic Education and
Election Monitoring.100 She has also presided over the Uganda Law Society, and
the Legal Aid Projects of the Uganda Law Society and the Law Development
Centre.101 She has received national, regional, and international awards in
recognition of her distinguished services as a Bar leader, judge, and human rights
activist.102
Sir Charles Michael Dennis Byron (St. Kitts & Nevis) was appointed
President of the Caribbean Court of Justice in September 2011.103 He graduated
from Cambridge University in 1966 with an M.A. and L.L.B., after which he was
in private practice throughout the Leeward Islands.104 In 1982, he was appointed
as a Judge of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, and in 1999 was appointed
Chief Justice.105 During his tenure, he engaged in many Judicial Reform
Programs.106 In 2004, Sir Dennis was appointed a Judge of the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).107 He was elected President
of the Tribunal in 2007, and served in this capacity until 2011.108 Sir Dennis has
been President of the Commonwealth Judicial Education Institute (CJEI) since
95. Justice Solomy Balungi Bossa - Uganda, AFR. CT. ON HUM. & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, http://en.africancourt.org/index.php/2-uncategorised/38-justice-solomy-balungi-bossa-uganda (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Hon. Sir Charles Michael Dennis Byron, EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUP. CT., https://www.eccourts.org/
brief-history-of-the-court/hon-sir-charles-michael-dennis-byron/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2017) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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2000.109 In 2004, he was appointed an Honorary Bencher of the Honourable
Society of the Inner Temple and holds the first Yogis & Keddy Chair in Human
Rights Law at Dalhousie University.110 He was knighted in 2000 and was
appointed a member of the Privy Council in 2004.111
Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi (Argentina) has been Judge of the
International Criminal Court since 2010 and President since 2015.112 She has
over 20 years of practice in international and humanitarian law and human
rights.113 Coming to the Court from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where she
was the Director General for Human Rights, Judge Fernández de Gurmendi
acted as a representative of Argentina in cases before the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.114 She has also represented Argentina before universal and regional
human rights bodies and advised on transitional justice issues related to the
prevention of genocide and other international crimes.115 Judge Fernández de
Gurmendi contributed to the creation and set-up of the ICC.116 She was also
instrumental in the negotiations of the complementary instruments of the Rome
Statute as chair of the Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as
well as the Working Group on Aggression.117 Her academic experience includes
professorships of international criminal law at the Universities of Buenos Aires
and Palermo, and as an assistant professor of international law at the University
of Buenos Aires.118 Judge Fernández de Gurmendi has also published a number
of national and international publications related to the ICC including, amongst
others, the role of the Prosecutor, criminal procedure, and the definitions of
victims.119
Tómas Heidar (Iceland) became a Judge of the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea on October 1, 2014. Previously, Judge Heidar served as
Legal Adviser of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland for almost twenty
years.120 As such, he was responsible for all matters of public international

109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. SILVIA ALEJANDRA FERNANDEZ DE GURMENDI, ICC NOW, available at http://iccnow.org/
documents/Fernandez_Gurmendi_-_CV.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. TOMAS HEIDAR, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, available at https://www.mfa.is/media/
Thjodrettarfr/THH-SummaryFINAL_A4.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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law.121 He represented Iceland regularly at meetings on oceans and the law of
the sea at the United Nations in New York and other international fora.122 He
was also in charge of a number of negotiations with neighboring countries on
maritime delimitation and fisheries.123 He was also Chairman of the National
Commission on Continental Shelf Limits, was in charge of preparing the
Submission of Iceland to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, and was Head of Delegation at meetings with the Commission.124 Judge
Heidar is the Director of the Law of the Sea Institute of Iceland and Co-director
and lecturer of the Rhodes Academy of Oceans Law and Policy, which holds a
prominent summer course each year in Rhodes, Greece.125 He is also a guest
lecturer on the Law of the Sea at the University of Iceland and many other
universities.126 Judge Heidar is author and editor of several books and articles on
ocean affairs and the law of the sea, and a lecturer in numerous academic
conferences and seminars in this field.127 He was awarded the title of
Ambassador on September 1, 2014.128
Vagn Joensen (Denmark) is currently a Judge at the United Nations
Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals and one of three Duty Judges at
its Arusha Branch.129 Judge Joensen also served as President and presiding judge
of the Trial Chamber of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR).130 Judge Joensen was first elected as ICTR President at a special
election held in February 2012 to fill the seat of the departing President upon her
assignment to the Appeals Chamber.131 Judge Joensen was re-elected to a second
term as ICTR President in April 2013 and he served as ICTR President until its
closure on December 31, 2015.132 He originally joined the Tribunal in May 2007
as ad litem judge and member of Trial Chamber III.133 Before joining the
Tribunal, Judge Joensen was a judge at the Danish High Court, Eastern Division,
in Copenhagen for more than a decade and served as an international judge at the
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United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from 2001 to 2002.134 He obtained
a Master of Law in 1973 from the University of Aarhus and studied at the City of
London College and Harvard Law School.135 Judge Joensen served in the Danish
Ministry of Justice until he was appointed a judge at the City Court of
Copenhagen in 1982.136 He has taught constitutional, criminal, and civil law at
the Law Faculty of the University of Aarhus and at the University of
Copenhagen.137
Theodor Meron (USA) has been a judge of the Appeals Chambers of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) since his election to the
ICTY in March 2001.138 He has served a total of four terms as President of the
ICTY and recently started on his second term as President of the MICT.139 As a
leading scholar of international humanitarian law, human rights, and international
criminal law, President Meron has authored a dozen books on international law
and chivalry in Shakespeare and more than a hundred articles, including some of
the books and articles that helped build the legal foundations for international
criminal tribunals.140 He is a member of the Institute of International Law and the
Council on Foreign Relations; a fellow of the American Academy of Arts; and
recipient of numerous awards, honors, and medals, such as the Hudson Medal
(ASIL) and Haskins Prize (ACLS), as well as Officer of the French Legion of
Honour and Grand Officier of the National Order of Merit.141 He is also past
honorary President of the American Society of International Law and past Editorin-Chief of the American Journal of International Law.142 He is Charles L.
Denison Professor of Law Emeritus at NYU Law School and since 2014, a
visiting professor of International Criminal Law at Oxford.143
Fatsah Ouguergouz (Algeria/France) is judge and former Vice-President
of the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights in Arusha, Tanzania.144 He
was United Nations Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in
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Burundi and has occupied various other positions within the United Nations
System, including the International Court of Justice (The Hague) and the Office
of Legal Affairs (New York).145 He holds a Ph.D. in International Law from the
Graduate Institute of International Law of Geneva, and has taught Public
International Law at the University of Geneva.146 He is a former Orville H. Schell
Fellow (Yale Law School, New Haven CT, USA), former visiting professor at
the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), and Father Robert F. Drinan Professor
of Human Rights at Georgetown University Law Center (Washington D.C.).147
Judge Ouguergouz is a Founding Member of the African Foundation for
International Law (The Hague) and the African Institute of International Law
(Arusha).148 He is a notable member of the International Commission of Jurists
(Geneva) and the Governing Board of the International Institute of Human Rights
(Strasbourg).149 He has published many articles and books and is Associate
Editor of the African Yearbook of International Law.150
Fausto Pocar (Italy) was President of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia from November 2005 until November 2008.151 He has
served on the Tribunal since February 2000. Since his appointment, he has served
first as a judge in a Trial Chamber and later in the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY
and ICTR, where he is still sitting.152 Judge Pocar has long-standing experience
in United Nations activities, in particular in the field of human rights and
international humanitarian law.153 He has served as a member and President of
the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR and was appointed Special
Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for visits to
Chechnya and the Russian Federation in 1995 and 1996.154 He has also been the
Italian delegate to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its
Legal Subcommittee.155 He is a Professor Emeritus of international law at the
University of Milan, where he has also served as Dean of the Faculty of Political
Sciences and Vice-Rector.156 He is the author of numerous publications on
international human rights and humanitarian law, public and private international
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law, and European law.157 He has lectured at the Hague Academy of International
Law and is a member and treasurer of the Institut de Droit International and
President of the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (Sanremo).158
András Sajó (Hungary) has been a judge of the European Court of Human
Rights since February 1, 2008 and ECtHR Vice-President since November 1,
2015.159 He obtained a law degree at the ELTE Law School of Budapest in
1972.160 He has held various research fellow positions at the Institute for State
and Law at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences since 1972.161 In 1977 and 1982,
he obtained a Ph.D. and Habilitation at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences,
respectively.162 He was the founder and spokesperson of the Hungarian League
for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Budapest from 1988 to 1994 and Legal
Counselor to the President of Hungary from 1991 to 1992.163 Judge Sajó was the
Chair of Comparative Constitutional Law and a University Professor at the
Central European University in Budapest from 1993 to 2007.164
Judge Sajó has been a member of the American Law Institute since 1996 and a
member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences since 1997.165 Since 1990, he has
been a recurrent visiting professor at the Cardozo School of Law in New York
and since 1996, at the Global Faculty of New York University Law School.166 He
was a member of the Board of Directors of the Open Society Justice Initiative of
New York from 2001 to 2007.167 His recent publications include Constitutional
Sentiments (Yale University Press, 2011) and Comparative Constitutionalism
(with Dorsen et al.) (West Academic Publishing, 3rd edition, 2016).168
Emmanuel Ugirashebuja (Rwanda) was appointed judge of the East
African Court of Justice Appellate Division in November 2013.169 He was
subsequently appointed President of the EACJ in June 2014.170 He holds a Ph.D.
in law, University of Edinburgh; LL.M., University of Edinburgh; and LL.B.,
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National University Rwanda.171 He is also the recipient of a Draper Hills Summer
Fellowship at Stanford University.172 Judge Ugirashebuja was previously Dean of
the Law School, University of Rwanda (2009 to 2014); member of the Superior
Council of Judiciary (2009 to 2014); member of the Supreme Council of
Prosecution (2009 to 2014); senior lecturer at the National University of Rwanda;
part of the team of experts in the East African Community on Fears, Challenges
and Concerns towards the East African Political Federation (2010 to 2011);
Legal Advisor at the Rwanda Environment Authority (2009); and legal advisor at
the Rwandan Constitution Commission (2001 to 2003).173 He has lectured at the
University of Edinburgh, University of Dar es Salaam, Rwanda Senior Command
and Staff and Rwanda National Police College.174 He is an expert and arbitrator
in both national and international arbitrations.175
Christine Van den Wyngaert (Belgium) was elected Judge of the
International Criminal Court as of March 11, 2009 for a term of nine years. 176
Assigned to the Trial Division, she assumed full-time duty on September 1,
2009.177 Prior to joining the ICC, Judge Van den Wyngaert served as a Judge in
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (2003 to 2009) and
as Judge ad hoc in the Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Belgium) at the International Court of Justice (2000 to 2002).178 In 2017, she
was appointed judge of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers, a position she will
assume when her term ends at the ICC. Judge Van den Wyngaert served as an
expert for the International Law Association, the European Union, and the
International Association of Penal Law (in 2014 elected Vice-President).179 In
addition, she was a member of the Criminal Procedure Reform Commission in
Belgium (Commission Franchimont) (1991 to 1998).180 Judge Van den Wyngaert
has been a professor of law at the University of Antwerp (1985 to 2005), visiting
fellow at the University of Cambridge (1994 to 1997), and visiting professor at
the Law Faculty of the University of Stellenbosch.181 Human rights have been a
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focal area of her teachings and writings throughout her career.182 In 2006, she
was awarded the Prize of the Human Rights League.183 In 2013, the Flemish
Government awarded Judge Van den Wyngaert a golden medal for her
achievements in international criminal law.184 She was granted the title of
Baroness by the King of Belgium for her merits as an academic and as an
international judge.185 This was followed in 2017 by an award of the Grand
Medal of Honour of the Flemish Government. She graduated from Brussels
University in 1974 and obtained a Ph.D. in International Criminal Law in
1979.186 She has been awarded four doctorates honoris causa (Uppsala University,
Sweden; University of Brussels, Belgium; University of Cleveland, Ohio, USA;
and Maastricht University, The Netherlands).187
Co-Directors
David Thór Björgvinsson (Iceland) is a professor of law at the Faculty of
Law, University of Copenhagen.188 Professor Björgvinsson served as judge of the
European Court of Human Rights in respect of Iceland from 2004 to 2013.189
Before he became a professor of law at Reykjavik University School of Law and
the University of Iceland Faculty of Law, he held numerous other positions for
public and private entities.190 Professor Björgvinsson has written books and
published numerous articles on his studies, given courses, and lectured in his
field in many countries.191 His main fields of research are general legal theory,
European Union (EEA) law, and human rights.192 He studied history, philosophy,
and law at the University of Iceland and legal philosophy at Duke University
School of Law in the United States of America.193 He is a doctor of international
law from Strasbourg University.194 He has done research in his field at the
University of Edinburgh in Scotland; Rand Afrikaans University in Johannesburg
in South Africa; the University of Copenhagen; Max Planck Institute in
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Heidelberg, Germany; and Oxford University in England.195
Richard J. Goldstone (South Africa) was a judge in South Africa for 23
years—the last nine of which he served as a Justice of the Constitutional Court.196
Since retiring from the bench, he has taught as a visiting professor in several
American law schools.197 From August 1994 to September 1996 he was the Chief
Prosecutor of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.198 He is an honorary bencher of the Inner Temple,
London and an honorary fellow of St. John’s College, Cambridge.199 He is an
honorary member of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and a
foreign member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.200 He is an
honorary life member of the International Bar Association and honorary
President of its Human Rights Institute.201 He chaired the Advisory Board of
Brandeis University’s International Center for Ethics, Justice and Public Life
from 2009 to 2017.202
Brandeis University
Leigh Swigart (USA) is Director of Programs in International Justice and
Society at the International Center for Ethics, Justice, and Public Life at
Brandeis University.203 She oversees the Brandeis Institute for International
Judges, which is the only regular event convening members of the international
judiciary across a wide spectrum of geographic and subject matter
jurisdictions.204 She also organizes the Brandeis Judicial Colloquia series, which
brings together international and national judges for dialogue about the growing
intersections between their spheres of work.205 Swigart is the coauthor, with
Center Director Daniel Terris and Cesare Romano, of The International Judge:
An Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases
(Brandeis University Press and Oxford University Press, 2007).206 Her academic
work and publications have focused on the challenges of language diversity in
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international criminal courts and tribunals; language use in post-colonial Africa;
and African immigration and refugee resettlement in the United States.207 Her
current research focuses on how the International Criminal Court manages the
challenges associated with accommodating African language speakers in its
investigations, in the courtroom, and in its outreach programming to affected
regions and victims.208 Swigart has a Ph.D. in sociocultural anthropology from
the University of Washington and is a two-time Fulbright scholar.209
Daniel Terris (USA) is the Director of the International Center for Ethics,
Justice, and Public Life at Brandeis University. An intellectual historian, he has
written on race and ethnicity in the United States, business ethics, and
international law and justice.210 His books include: Ethics at Work: Creating
Virtue in an American Corporation and The International Judge: An
Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World’s Cases (with
Leigh Swigart and Cesare P.R. Romano).211 As an academic entrepreneur and
leader, Dr. Terris has overseen the development of many signature programs of
Brandeis University, including the Brandeis Institute for International Judges,
Brandeis-Genesis Institute for Russian Jewry, Master’s Program in Coexistence
and Conflict, and University’s Division of Graduate Professional Studies.212 Dr.
Terris has also served as the University’s Vice-President for Global Affairs,
and built new connections for Brandeis in Israel, India, The Netherlands, and
other countries.213 Daniel Terris received his Ph.D. in the history of American
civilization from Harvard University.214
Brandeis Interns
Chantal Sochaczevski (USA/Canada) is from Montreal.215 She graduated
from Brandeis University in 2017 with a double major in Business and
Psychology and a double minor in Legal Studies and Global Studies.216 During
the summer of 2014, after her first year of university, she participated in the
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Brandeis in The Hague program.217 During her junior year, she studied abroad in
Sydney, Australia and had the opportunity to intern for the International
Commission of Jurists Australia.
Lee Wilson (USA) recently completed his junior year at Brandeis University,
where he is majoring in International and Global Studies and Economics and is
minoring in French and Francophone Studies and History. He attended the
Brandeis in The Hague program during the summer of 2015, where he studied
international criminal justice and legal implications of certain international
institutions and initiatives.218 During his time in The Hague, Lee had the
opportunity to participate in a moot court, where he pleaded before Judge Ivana
Hrdličková of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. 219 His previous experience with
law also includes an internship with Christos Diktas, Esq., who specializes in
municipal law. Lee intends on pursuing a degree in law to be used as a tool for
justice and for the prevention of future conflicts.
iCourts/Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen
Federico Fabbrini (Italy) is a tenured Associate Professor of European &
International Law.220 He holds a B.A. in European & Transnational Legal Studies
from the University of Trento (2006), a J.D. in International Law from the
University of Bologna (2008), and a Ph.D. in Law from the European University
Institute (2012).221 He clerked for Justice Sabino Cassese at the Italian
Constitutional Court (2010 to 2011) and qualified for the bar exam in Italy
(2011).222 Before joining iCourts, he was Assistant Professor of European &
Comparative Constitutional Law at Tilburg Law School in the Netherlands,
where he was awarded tenure.223 Professor Fabbrini’s main areas of research are
European, comparative and international law, with a focus on federalism,
fundamental rights, separation of powers, economic governance, and national
security, mainly in a comparative perspective between the European Union and
the United States.224 On these topics he has published in, among others, the
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Oxford Yearbook of European Law, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal
Studies, European Constitutional Law Review, Common Market Law Review,
European Law Review, Columbia Journal of European Law, Georgetown
Journal of International Law, Berkeley Journal of International Law, Human
Rights Law Review, and Harvard Human Rights Journal.225 Professor Fabbrini
has published two monographs with Oxford University Press: Fundamental
Rights in Europe: Challenges and Transformations in Comparative Perspective
(2014, the published version of his Ph.D. thesis at the EUI) and Economic
Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges
(2016).226 Moreover, he has co-edited four other volumes with Hart Publishing
and Elgar Publishing, and edited two special journal issues.
Henrik Stampe Lund (Denmark) is center administrator and daily manager
at iCourts, Centre of Excellence for International Courts, at the Faculty of Law,
University of Copenhagen. He is responsible for budgeting, allocating resources,
and strategic planning related to research activities at iCourts. Over the last
decade, he has in four different positions (in the humanities, the veterinary field,
and law) worked with larger EU applications and EU consultancy, and is
especially experienced in writing strategic parts of research applications. He has
followed the development of research policy closely and published academic
articles about European research policy. He has also worked as a lobbyist in
Brussels on behalf of the Technical University of Denmark and as a veterinary
medical industrial partner. Lund holds a Master of Arts and Ph.D. in literature
and has nine years of research experience within the field of literary studies. His
academic publications reflect a broad and interdisciplinary interest in topics such
as European literature and history, democracy and governance, political theory,
and philosophy of law. In addition, he has published books on the practice and
theory of judgment and democracy. He has taught in the university sector for
more than 20 years.
Mikael Rask Madsen (Denmark) is professor of European Law and
Integration and Director of iCourts, Centre of Excellence for International
Courts, at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen.227 Trained as both a
sociologist and a jurist, Madsen’s research is focused on international courts and
the globalization of legal practices and practitioners.228 Madsen is the author of
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more than one hundred articles and book chapters, as well as La Genèse de
l’Europe des droits de l’homme: Enjeux juridiques et stratégies d’Etat (Presses
Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2010) and co-editor of The European Court of
Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2011/13);
Making Human Rights Intelligible: Towards a Sociology of Human Rights (Hart
Publishing, 2013); Transnational Power Elites: The New Professionals of
Governance, Law and Security (Routledge, 2013); and Law and the Formation of
Modern Europe: Perspectives from the Historical Sociology of Law.229
Urška Šadl (Slovenia) is an Associate Professor at iCourts Centre of
Excellence for International Courts at the Faculty of Law, University of
Copenhagen.230 She holds an LL.M. in Legal Studies from the College of Europe
in Bruges and a Ph.D. from the University of Copenhagen.231 Urška completed
longer research stays at King’s College, London, Institute of European and
Comparative Law at the University of Oxford, and most recently visited the
University of Michigan in Ann Arbor as a Grotius Research Scholar.232 Her
primary research interests include empirical studies of European courts, the
theory and practice of judicial precedents, European citizenship, and topics in
European constitutional law more generally.233 Her research appears inter alia in
the European Law Journal, European Law Review, Columbia Journal of
European Law, and European Constitutional Law Review.234 Professor Šadl is
currently completing a research project, The Atlas of Legal Evolution: The Case
of EU Law, which is financed by The Danish Council for Independent Research
and the Sapare Aude Research Talent grant.
iCourts Rapporteurs
Kerstin Bree Carlson (USA/Ireland) is a post-doctoral researcher at
iCourts, the Danish National Research Foundation’s Centre for Excellence in
International Courts at the Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, where she
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works on questions pertaining to international criminal law.235 She has written
several articles and a manuscript regarding the ICTY and its reception in the
former Yugoslavia, and currently works on the Habré trial in Senegal.236 Prior to
coming to iCourts, she was an Assistant Professor and department co-chair
(International & Comparative Politics) at the American University of Paris.237
Kerstin practiced international arbitration at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton in
Paris; clerked for a U.S. district court judge, the Honorable David Folsom, in
Texas; and received two Fulbright research grants, one to Croatia and the second
to UNESCO in Paris.238 She has a J.D. and a Ph.D. from the University of
California at Berkeley, and originally hails from the U.S.’s east coast.239
Harry James Rose (UK) is an LL.M. student at the Law Faculty of the
University of Copenhagen. His studies thus far have focused on questions
surrounding international trade and development law. Prior to coming to the
University of Copenhagen, he studied for his LL.B. at the University of Durham
(Van Mildert College), where he graduated with upper 2nd class honours. Rose
spent a year working in an international consultancy in the UK, which provided
advice to large world-leading companies on maintaining positive stakeholder and
shareholder relations. Rose is a fluent speaker of German, having lived in
Hannover, and originally hails from the English county of Worcestershire.
Institute Guests
Hans Corell (Sweden) served as Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs
and Legal Counsel of the United Nations from March 1994 to 2004.240 In this
capacity, he was head of the Office of Legal Affairs in the United Nations
Secretariat.241 Before joining the United Nations, he was Ambassador and UnderSecretary for Legal and Consular Affairs in his native Sweden’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs from 1984 to 1994.242 From 1962 to 1972, he served first as a law
clerk and later as a judge in circuit courts and appeal courts.243 In 1972, he joined
the Ministry of Justice, where he became a Director in 1979 and the Chief Legal
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Officer in 1981.244 Corell was a member of Sweden’s delegation to the UN
General Assembly from 1985 to 1993 and has had several assignments related to
the Council of Europe, OECD, and CSCE (now OSCE).245 He co-authored the
CSCE proposal for the establishment of the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, which was transmitted to the UN in February 1993.246 In 1998, he
was the Secretary-General’s representative at the Rome Conference on the
International Criminal Court.247 Since his retirement from public service in 2004,
Corell has engaged in many different activities in the legal field, inter alia as
legal adviser, lecturer, and member of different boards.248
Andreas Føllesdal (Norway) is Professor of Political Philosophy at the
Faculty of Law, University of Oslo.249 He is principal investigator of European
Research Council Advanced Grant MultiRights 2011 to 2016, on the Legitimacy of
Multi-Level Human Rights Judiciary, and Co-Director of the PluriCourts Centre of
Excellence for the Study of the Legitimate Roles of the Judiciary in the Global
Order.250 Føllesdal received his Ph.D. in 1991 in Philosophy from Harvard
University.251 He publishes in the field of political philosophy, mainly on issues of
international political and legal theory, globalization/Europeanization, human
rights, and socially responsible investing.252
Geir Ulfstein (Norway) is Professor of International Law at the Department
of Public and International Law, University of Oslo and Co-Director of the
PluriCourts Centre for the Study of the Legitimate Roles of the Judiciary in the
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